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Using Risk Analysis to Classify Junk Bonds as
Equity for Federal Income Tax Purposes
DAViD V CERYAK*
INTRODUCTION
A continuing dilemma in tax law is where and how to draw the line
distinguishing debt securities from equity securities. The basic rule, as
articulated in section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"),
appears simple: interest paid or accrued on indebtedness is allowed as a
deductible business expense.' Conversely, payments made to equity-holders
(i.e., dividends) do not give rise to a deduction. The problem with these
polar, distinct rules is that many of the financial instruments to which they
apply are not distinct. These hybrid instruments lie on a continuum between
traditional forms of debt and equity, and as a result, the polar rules provide
little or no guidance. 2
Corporations have capitalized on the simplicity of the term "indebted-
ness" in section 163(a) by labeling as "debt" many financial instruments
that only remotely resemble classic debt. 3 This approach provides tremendous
financial benefits because all payments that the corporation makes to the
holders of these "debt" instruments are deductible, thus greatly reducing
* J.D. Candidate, 1991, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1988,
Miarm Umversity.
1. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1988) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness.").
2. The U.S. Supreme Court has defined a "hybrid" security as a security with an
"intermingling of the traditional features of stock and bonds," "the half-breed offspring of
both." John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 535 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
The Department of the Treasury (the "Treasury") had defined a hybrid as an instrument
convertible into stock or one that provides for any contingent payment to the holder. Treas.
Reg. § 1.385-3(e) (1982), withdrawn, T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (effective Aug. 5, 1983). This
Note rejects classifying high-yield instruments as hybnds with separable debt and equity
components, arguing instead for treating the instrument as an all-equity interest even if its
fixed rate is contingent upon an interest rate index or firm profitability. See infra notes 65-
112 and accompanying text.
3. "Classic debt," or straight debt, is defined as 'an unqualified obligation to pay a
sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest
payable regardless of the debtor's income or the lack thereof."' Plumb, The Federal Income
Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. Rnv 369,
404 (1971) (quoting Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402 (2d Cir. 1957)). As corporations
increasingly engage in leveraged buyouts and other sophisticated corporate restructuring trans-
actions, the importance of distinguishing debt from equity is magnified. See Rudnick, Who
Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W Rns. L. REv 965, 1246-54
(1988-89).
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the corporation's income tax burden. However, because corporate share-
holders and management are not willing to sacrifice the advantages of
issuing securities containing equity features, 4 they have crafted hybrid se-
curities which retain equity features, but which have the tax advantages of
debt.
This Note explores the problem of characterizing debt and equity for tax
purposes and concludes that the degree of investor risk should be used to
determine how to classify an instrument. Part I discusses the concept of
interest. Part II looks at the policies implicated in the debt-equity controversy
and suggests how these policies can support principled distinctions between
debt and equity The techniques that the courts and the Internal Revenue
Service (the "IRS") currently use to deal with this problem are discussed
in Part III. Part III also sets forth the policies and goals that regulation in
this area should achieve. While existing techniques classify junk bonds5 as
indebtedness, Part IV of this Note proposes an alternative method of
distinguishing debt from equity which classifies junk bonds as equity By
identifying the specific interest rate at which equity risks are involved, Part
IV also supplies a vital link in the formation of a partially-integrated
corporate tax system.6 Part V discusses how the technique proposed to
classify junk bonds can be applied to any security to determine whether its
nature is either debt or equity
I. A PRELnmNARY INQUIRY INTO "INTEREST"
Another way to view the deductibility issue is to say that section 163(a)7
allows deduction for interest payments but prohibits deductions for dividend
4. The flexibility and variety of a hybrid security offers advantages to both the corporation
and the investor. For example, a convertible bond is more attractive to investors than a
standard bond because investors value the ability to exchange their debt instrument for an
equity instrument in the future if such an exchange becomes financially beneficial. This type
of investment also saves investors the additional cost of acquiring the same opportunities
through the options market. Furthermore, many investors who are subject to restraints on
equity investments can obtain deferred equity financing in this manner. The primary advantage
to the corporation, of course, is that the investors value these equity features, which means
that they will demand a lower rate of return from the issuing corporation. Madison, The
Deductibility of Interest on Hybrid Securities, 39 TAx LAW 465, 467 (1986). See generally R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CoipoRATE FiNANCE 521-35 (3d ed. 1988) (overview of
two hybrids: warrants and convertible securities).
5. High-yield, high-return bonds are commonly referred to as junk bonds. Junk bonds
can also be defined as those bonds that are below investment grade, or those rated below
"Baa" by Moody's rating service. See R. BREAEY & S. MYERS, supra note 4, at 307
6. An integrated tax system will grant relief (e.g., a deduction) to corporations for
dividend payments. A proper definition of a deductible interest expense is the first step in
granting corporate-level relief for dividend payments. After defimng the maximum percentage
that an instrument can return and still be classified as debt, any excess percentage can be
treated as dividends (and granted the appropriate relief), notwithstanding the fact that the
excess return in question purports to be a payment on a debt instrument. See Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 25, at G-9 (Feb. 6, 1990) ("[E]limination of the distinction between debt and
equity is the single most important issue to be resolved by corporate tax integration."); see
also infra note 12 and accompanying text.
7 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1988).
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payments. However, these labels wither under further analysis, so that in
the context of classifying debt and equity, interest is by itself an empty
label. The United States Supreme Court has defined interest on indebtedness
as "compensation for the use or forbearance of money."" The problem
with this definition is that it is of no help in distinguishing which types of
"uses or forbearances" will qualify under section 163(a)'s deduction allow-
ance. If the definition is taken at face value, then any time a corporation
paid a dividend on a share of common stock, the corporation would be
compensating the shareholder for the use of her money and would get to
take a deduction. 9 Simply defining "interest" begs the question of where
to draw the line between debt and equity.
II. TAx POLICY AND = DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
A. The Policies Behind Interest Deductibility
The importance of properly classifying corporate financial instruments as
either debt or equity cannot be understated in corporate tax law. Indeed,
the problem of distinguishing debt from equity is in essence a question of
defining corporate income. The Code is straightforward in providing that
corporations are taxed on income net of deductible expenses.' 0 The Code
classifies payments to creditors as a deductible expense." This provision is
based on the judgment that corporations should not be taxed on funds that
are used to service debt. However, this view of corporate income becomes
inadequate when confronted with the myriad of complex financial instru-
ments that are issued as "debt." Thus, a more refined policy must be
developed that justifies the section 163 deduction and also distinguishes
borderline securities.
The starting point is to accept the premise that a separate corporate
income tax is appropriate. Indeed, there have been many proposals
8. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940). Unless specified otherwise, this is the
sense in which the term "interest" will be used throughout this Note. In the context of
financial theory, the "interest rate" is the means for discounting future consequences into
current transfer prices and is determined by individuals' time preference, productivity and
uncertainty regarding the future. De Alessi, How Markets Alleviate Scarcity, in RETINKING
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYsiS & DEVELOPMENT: IssuEs, ALTERNATiES, & Choices 358-59 (1988).
9. See Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments, 43 TAX L. REV 731,
788 (1988) ("[A] manufacturer compensates a customer for the use of a pre-payment, an
optionor compensates an optionee for the 'use of an option premium, and the issuer of
preferred stock compensates the holder for the use of the issue price."); cf. Old Colony v.
Commussioner, 284 U.S. 552, 561 (1932) (.'[I]nterest' means what is usually called interest by
those who pay and those who receive the amount and [does] not refer to some esoteric
concept derived from subtle and theoretical analysis.").
10. I.R.C. § 63 (1988).
11. I.R.C. § 163 (1988).
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advocating the elimination of the corporate income tax through integration. 12
However, "[t]he political consensus .. [has always been] that separate
taxation of corporate income is warranted,"' 3 and the policy justifications
behind charging a premium to corporations in the form of double taxation
of corporate income14 will likely persevere. 5 Again, it is important to note
that the proposal suggested in Part IV of this Note will still be effective
and fully functional under a partially integrated revision of the corporate
income tax.16 Given a separate corporate income tax, the problem becomes
one of defimng exactly what portion of gross income 7 should be taxed.
One persuasive justification for not taxing funds that are used to pay
interest on debt is "to prevent an increase in tax for a transaction that has
caused no increase in anyone's wealth or net income."'" The danger of
taxing too great a portion of income (by disallowing deductions for legiti-
mate payments on debt instruments) is that some of this tax will be based
on gross income, thereby denying taxpayers their right to deduct "ordinary
and necessary" business expenses. 19 The danger of taxing too small a portion
(allowing deductions for payments on equity instruments) is the erosion of
the double-tax system. 20
12. Integration could be accomplished by any of several means, most likely allowing a
corporate deduction for dividends paid, allowing shareholders a credit for their share of
corporate taxes paid or by simply taxing shareholders on their share of the corporation's net
income, similar to partnership taxation. For a discussion of the pros and cons of these ideas,
see A.L.I., FEDERtAL Ico.mE TAX PROJECT 49-53 (Reporter's Study Draft June 1, 1989); see
also Taylor & Aidinoff, Approaches to Debt: Is Integration the Answer?, 67 TAXEs 931, 933
(1989) ("[I]ntegration would answer [the overleveraging] problem by eliminating the tax burden
on distributed earnings and thus the tax discrepancy between interest-bearing debt and equity.").
13. Sheppard, Should Junk Bond Interest Deductions Be Disallowed?, 34 TAX NOTES 1142,
1147 (1987).
14. The benefits of limited liability have been used to justify the double taxation of
corporate income. For a discussion of this and other justifications, see Comment, Hybrid
Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. Cm. L. Rv 118,
125 n.33 (1985).
15. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1147 ("We are not going to get integration any time
soon.").
16. Under partial integration, a proposal, such as the one in this Note which identifies
those "interest" payments that should properly be classified as dividends, essentially determines
which payments should be fully deductible (those payments on true debt instruments) and
which payments should be non-deductible and therefore subject to relief through a partially
integrated tax system. A.L.I., supra note 12, at 87. A fully integrated tax system, of course,
would make such a determination moot, since characterization of payments as dividends or
interest would no longer be of any significance.
17 Gross income is generally defined as gross receipts less cost of goods sold. BLACK'S
LAW DicTIoNARY 632 (5th ed. 1979).
18. A.L.I., supra note 12, at 8.
19. Under this view interest expense should be deductible even without the express assurance
of I.R.C. § 163(a), because making such payments is necessitated in the ordinary course of a
normal business. In this way, deductions for interest paid on true indebtedness and deductions
for wages or rental expense are equally legitimate deductions under the "ordinary and necessary
expenses" allowance of I.R.C. § 162(a) (1988).
20. The integrity of § 163 is vital to the corporate tax structure itself. If § 163 became
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The focus of this analysis rests on proper measurement of economic
income. When distinguishing debt from equity, the proper task is to deter-
mine whether permitting a section 163(a) deduction on a particular instru-
ment will result in proper income measurement. Those financial instruments
that economically are not debt should not be granted a section 163(a)
deduction regardless of the form of the instrument, the form of payment
or the purpose for which the funds are used. The key ingredient to
classification, therefore, is to find the true nature of the instrument itself,
because once determined, the resulting deductibility (or non-deductibility)
under section 163(a) is a proper measurement of income.
B. Using Tax Policy to Distinguish Between Debt and Equity
The basic criteria for separating true debt instruments from true equity
instruments are simple. Funds transferred with a reasonable expectation of
repayment are debt. 2' This type of a debtor-creditor relationship generally
operates independently of the risk of success of the business. 22 When a
financial instrument's nature gives rise to such a relationship, the tax
system's net income concept warrants deductibility An equity-holder, on
the other hand, participates "in the pot luck of the enterprise." 23 An equity
investor is "an adventurer in the corporate business," 24 experiencing the
entrepreneurial risks that the business will profitY When the very essence
of a financial instrument fits this description of equity, then not allowing
a deduction for the corporate payment properly measures income. Payments
on such equity instruments are not a cost of doing business, but rather a
distribution of profits that must be included in a corporation's before-tax
income.
Unfortunately, courts have been unsuccessful in applying this somewhat
"spiritual" distinction,26 and the legislature has done little better. 27 Fur-
thermore, many scholars doubt that any practical application of these ideas
is even possible,2 because of the lack of any quantifiable measure. However,
these spiritual concepts can be brought to life through risk analysis which,
in Part IV of this Note, transforms these policies into a workable tool
which classifies financial instruments to properly measure economic income.
ineffective, all dividend payments would be deductible and there would no longer be a double-
tax on corporate income.
21. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1957).
22. Commissioner v. O.P.P Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
23. Aqualane Shares, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d i16, 119 (5th Cir. 1959).
24. O.P.P Holding Corp., 76 F.2d at 12.
25. Sherwood Memonal Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 211, 229 n.30 (1964).
26. See mnfra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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C. The Macroeconomic Effects of Misclassifying
Debt and Equity
There are serious practical concerns to consider for corporate behavior
when classifying debt and equity for tax purposes. A major concern in this
area is neutrality of the tax laws. 29 By allowing a deduction for interest
paid on debt, section 163 "provides a strong incentive for debt rather than
equity financ[ing].''30 Although allowing a deduction for legitimate debt
payments is proper in measuring net income, improperly classifying true
equity instruments as debt instruments provides an incentive for debt-
financing far beyond that which could have been contemplated by the
originators of the "net" income concept.
The bottom line effect of encouraging debt financing is the existence of
a larger amount of debt outstanding and a smaller amount of equity 31 This
is widely viewed as dangerous and unstable.3 2 The huge premiums paid in
leveraged buyouts33 are also thought to be a result of these potential tax
savings.3 4 Those concerned with these problems emphasize the need to bring
neutrality to the system so that tax considerations alone do not drive
corporate transactions, but are driven by their underlying economic value. 35
Someproposals addressing the interest deductibility issue are aimed di-
rectly at these effects, disallowing interest deductions for debt incurred to
replace existing equity 36 Focusing on these practical effects, however, when
fashiomng a solution to the debt-equity problem, is misguided for two
29. See A.L.I., supra note 12, at 39.
30. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 101ST CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF
CORPORAmTE FINA LCtxi STRucTUREs 53 (Comm. Print 1989).
31. In each of 1984, 1985 and 1986, approximately $75 billion of corporate equity was
eliminated and replaced by debt. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1142.
32. Some common concerns are that (1) increased debt erodes the tax base, (2) increased
leveraging increases the chance of future financial collapse, (3) increased leveraging reduces
research and development expenditures due to a lack of cash and (4) increased debt causes
other inefficiencies resulting from the desire for short-term profit maximization. Thompson,
A Suggested Approach to Debt/Equity Issues and Leveraged Acquisitions, 42 TAX NOTES 483,
484 (1989).
33. A leveraged buyout is a "debt-financed acquisition in which the acquiring group
finances the acquisition of an existing target corporation primarily with debt secured by
the assets or stock of the target corporation." JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 30, at 6.
34. However, buyout premiums (and therefore buyout incentives) might also come from
other sources, specifically: (1) better management, (2) tighter financial discipline, (3) synergy
with the acquiror's business line, (4) corporate shares that normally sell at a discount or (5)
a portion of the value of the existing bondholders' assets is taken away because the debt they
hold is now less credit worthy. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 30, at 58-63.
35. A.L.I., supra note 12, at 40 ("Those who celebrate the efficacy of markets for allocating
resources should welcome the elimination of tax biases that undermine the market
process.").
36. For one such proposal, see A.L.I., supra note 12, at 40-42.
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reasons. First, these effects are merely symptoms of the real problem.3 7
Disallowing an interest deduction for a debt instrument (if it truly be a
debt instrument) solely because it was used to finance a takeover distorts
the real economic policies. Conversely, allowing a deduction for what is
really an equity instrument just because the proceeds were used for other
than a leveraged buyout is unsound because it takes a step towards eroding
the existing two-tier corporate tax structure. The problem here is in iden-
tifying the securities themselves as debt or equity, and the mere symptoms-
the uses of the proceeds from the instruments-are not the proper policy
focus for a solution. A second flaw of the "practical approach" is the
extreme difficulty of predicting and controlling corporate behavior. The
prediction problem is particularly acute in the present context, because "the
impact of taxation on corporate financial policy is very poorly under-
stood."" Therefore, attempting to draw a distinction between debt and
equity based on policies of changing corporate behavior seems futile.
There certainly is a need for concern when corporate financial structure
radically changes shape, as it has done recently. However, narrowly focusing
these concerns has hindered efforts to resolve the debt-equity problem.
Focusing on the basic goals of the corporate income tax-proper measure-
ment of economic income-will, however, avoid these distractions. Tis will
allow tax law to attack the heart of the problem-the determination of the
essential character of a security as either debt or equity
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT LAW
Although section 163(a)3 9 authorizes a deduction for interest, the section
that takes center stage in the debt-equity controversy is section 385,40 entitled
"Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness."
Additionally, an overabundance of common law doctrine has developed
surrounding these Code sections. Following is a discussion of the legislative
and judicial attempts at solving the debt-equity dilemma-attempts that
raise more questions than they answer.
37. See Perry & Taggart, The Growing Role of Junk Bonds in Corporate Finance, I J.
AFPuan Coap. Frm. 37, 45 (1988) (concluding that junk bonds are a product of various
economic forces-a symptom rather than a solution).
38. A. Auerbach, Tax Policy and Corporate Borrowing 31 (Sept. 1989) (prepared for the
October, 1989 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's conference Are the Distinctions Between
Equity and Debt Disappeanng.?) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal);
see also id. at 1 ("[C]hanges in tax incentives are not the primary cause of the shift towards
debt.").
39. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1988).
40. I.R.C. § 385 (1988).
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A. Statutory Regulation
Section 385 was enacted to clear up the vagueness in section 163(a)'s
"interest or indebtedness' '4 language. Unfortunately, however, section 385
did not respond directly to the debt-equity classification problem. Instead,
it merely grants authority to the Treasury to prescribe regulations necessary
to determine whether a type of security is debt or equity 42 Section 385(b)
contains a set of factors that the Treasury may use in constructing its
regulations.43 These factors essentially are agreed upon characteristics which
traditionally have distinguished debt instruments (such as bonds) from equity
instruments (such as common stock). Keeping these traditionally distinct
instruments in mind as examples aids analysis of the section 385(b) factors.
Under the first factor, 44 debt characterization will result from the existence
of those features that are typical of a simple bond or loan. The second
factor45 derives from the fact that the more subordinated a security is, the
closer it resembles common stock, whose holders receive interim or liqui-
dating payments only after all other claimants have been satisfied. The third
factor46 attempts to identify those corporations that are inadequately capi-
talized and thus are subject to having their purported debt recharacterized
as equity to comport with some minimal debt-to-equity ratio.47 The fourth
factor" looks directly to the future form of the security, taking into account
the possibility that a firm with a convertible bond outstanding has in essence
a potential share of common stock outstanding. 49 The final factor 0 scruti-
nizes corporations that are making distributions to debtholders in amounts
contingent upon their status as stockholders, thus rendering the debt security
a mere surrogate for common stock.
41. 1.R.C. § 163(a).
42. I.R.C. § 385(a).
43. I.R.C. § 385(b). For a discussion of these factors, see infra notes 44-50 and accom-
panying text.
44. "[W]hether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand or on a specified
date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate consideration in money or money's
worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest " I.R.C. § 385(b)(1).
45. "[Wlhether there is subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the
corporation " I.R.C. § 385(b)(2).
46. "[T]he ratio of debt to equity of the corporation " I.R.C. § 385(b)(3).
47. The Treasury has attempted to characterize otherwise straight debt as equity when the
debt-to-equity ratio of the corporation exceeded ten to one. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1144-
45.
48. "[Wihether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation " I.R.C. §
385(b)(4).
49. See R. BREALEY & S. MYEts, supra note 4, at 528 (characterizing a convertible bond
as a combination of a bond and a call option on the firm's stock).
50. "[T]he relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of the
interest in question." I.R.C. § 385(b)(5).
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With these factors in mind, the Treasury asserted the authority granted
it under section 385. In 1980 it proposed regulation section 1.385,51 which
became effective on July 1, 1982.52 The regulation created a bright-line test
that classified a hybrid security as debt if it was not issued in proportion
to stock holdings, 53 and if the fair market value of the debt features of the
security exceeded fifty percent of the total value of the debt and equity
features combined.5 4 Thus, if the value of a bond's debt features (e.g., fixed
payments and principal repayment as described in section 385(b)(1)) were
less than half of the total value of the security, then the security was
classified as equity and no deduction was allowed for payments made
pursuant to the instrument.
It did not take long for corporations to mampulate tls rigid rule.
Predictably, instruments were issued containing many equity features, but
which had guaranteed payments of just greater than half the issue price. In
1983, in response to these corporate practices, the IRS took a stand by
ruling that a particular kind of security,55 even though it was classified as
debt under section 1.385, will nonetheless be taxed as an equity instrument. 6
Because the section 1.385 regulations had now been effectively rejected by
the IRS, they were soon after officially withdrawn. 7
No additional regulations have yet been issued under section 385. Fur-
thermore, most lawmakers believe that section 385 is incapable of spawning
workable regulations.58 Because of this impotence on the part of the legis-
lators and administrators, courts have been virtually set free to fashion their
own individual tests, which has led to the quandary described below
B. Case Law
The approach that the courts have taken, both before the Treasury
regulations were enacted and since their dermse, is known as the "facts and
51. Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (1982), withdrawn, T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (effective Aug. 5,
1983).
52. B. BrrTKER & J. EusncE, FEDERAL INcomE TAxATION OF CORORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 4.05 (4th ed. Supp. No. 2 1987).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-6(c).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(a).
55. The securities in question were labeled "adjustable rate convertible notes" and had
equity features such as variable payments tied to common stock dividends and conversion
privileges.
56. Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40.
57. T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69 (effective Aug. 5, 1983).
58. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1144 ("[A]sk any government tax official about section
385 and he rolls his eyes."). The current provisions of I.R.C. § 163(e)(5) & (i), which defer
(and in some cases disallow) the interest deduction for certain high-yield instruments is a stop-
gap measure that does not solve the underlying classification probles that this Note addresses.
1990] 1 281
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circumstances" test.59 Courts used this test to decide each case "on its own
umque factual flavor."'  Understandably, this led to the development of an
inordinate number of factors (at least thirty-eight) 6 to be considered when
deciding whether a particular security should be taxed as debt or equity.62
One can imagine the lack of guidance a corporate planner or a distnct
judge faces when called upon to make a decision in this area, when the
cases at best offer tentative clues to the distinctions between deductibility
and non-deductibility 63
The current law dealing with the debt-equity problem needs to be changed
for two reasons. First, as the above discussion demonstrates, there is no
workable consensus as to what the law is. Second, current law, even when
it is applied consistently, often produces results that are contrary to sound
tax policy.64
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
There is no one clear answer to the multitude of difficulties surrounding
the classification of financial iftstruments for tax purposes. The remaining
portion of this Note, however, shows that risk analysis provides an analyt-
ically sound classification of financial instruments. This Note uses junk
bonds as an example, but the analysis can be applied to any financial
instrument. The general thesis for the remaimng analysis is this: the degree
of risk that an investor perceives necessarily indicates whether a security is
in essence debt or equity
59. Integral in the development of this approach was a rare Supreme Court decision in
this area, John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521, 530 (1946) (There is no one
characteristic which is determinative in this situation.). The IRS recently applied this approach
in a technical advice memorandum, in which it concluded that "the preferred stock of Corp.
X is properly classified for federal income tax purposes as equity because the charactenstics
of such stock, taken as a whole, more closely resemble those of an equity interest in a
corporation rather than those of a debt instrument." Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 166, at K-I
(Aug. 27, 1990).
60. American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 848 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
61. For a list of these factors, see Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAxEs
4 (1969).
62. Factors named as important by the IRS include (1) the name given the instrument, (2)
a fixed maturity date, (3) payment not dependent on earmngs, (4) the right to seek court
enforcement in the event of a default, (5) their capitalization, (6) identity of interests between
shareholders and creditors, (7) the ability to obtain loans from outside lending institutions and
(8) timely payment of all sums due by the borrower. Pusker, Debt-Equity Guidelines Subsequent
to Withdrawal of Proposed Regulations, 67 TAXEs 88, 90 (1989); see also Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA) No. 166, at K-i (Aug. 27, 1990) ("Although no single factor is determinative of the
debt-equity issue, [the IRS recogmzes that] courts give considerable weight to the intent and
regulation of the parties involved.").
63. American Processing, 371 F.2d at 848 ("So large is [the number of cases] and disparate
their facts, that for every parallel found, a qualification hides in the thicket.").
64. The one application that produces the wrong such result specifically dealt with in this
Note is when current law is applied to junk bonds. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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A. Risk Analysis
The rate of interest paid on a loan depends on how much risk the lender
incurs. Whenever there is risk, the investor must be compensated with a
higher prenuum. 15 The amount of risk that is present in various types of
investments can be illustrated by examnning the returns of four security-
types.6 Investment in a short-term Treasury bill (type (1)) is about the safest
investment one can make. The average return on a Treasury bill will be
less than that of a long-term government bond (type (2)), because the
investor in such a bond must be compensated for the risk that interest rates
will increase while the rate on the bond remains static. Investors will demand
an even higher return for a corporate bond (type (3)) because unlike
investment types (1) and (2), this instrument has an additional risk that the
firm will not be able to meet its payment obligations (i.e., default risk).
An investor in common stock (type (4)) has the greatest risk because she is
now an owner instead of a creditor and has a direct share in the risks of
the enterprise. There is, in effect, an "equity premium"-an increased
return demanded when switching from an investment in the corporation's
debt to an investment in its common stock.
Tax law treats instruments m categories (1), (2) and (3) as debt, and
section 163 allows a deduction for interest paid on those instruments.
Traditional theory would insert junk bonds into category (3) of the above
analysis-the same as a corporate bond, so that payments on junk obliga-
tions are therefore granted full deductibility.67 As a result, a corporation
making eight-percent payments on a high-grade bond and also making
sixteen-percent payments on a junk bond would have traditionally received
a full deduction for both. After only the simple risk discussion set forth
above, this result should already seem counter-intuitive. If a corporation
must pay an extremely high rate of interest on a bond, investors are
perceiving a greater amount of risk. As illustrated, the incremental risk that
exceeds that of a corporate bond is a risk of the enterprise associated with
an equity investment such as common stock. Regardless of the form of the
investment, investors who receive such a high rate of interest are really
receiving an "equity premium." 6 The law should recognize that investors
who demand an "equity premium" for shouldering high risk are no longer
65. Fisher, Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds, 67 J. PoL. EcoN. 217
(1959).
66. This illustration is derived from R. BREAIBY & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 125-26.
67. Applying the factors delineated at supra note 62 shows that junk bonds will be classified
as debt (e.g., junk bonds are labeled "debt" and have a fixed maturity date, the payments
are not directly linked to earnings and there is normally no identity of interest with share-
holders).
68. For an illustration of the increased premium demanded in return for equity investments,
see IBBoTsoN AssocrAaEs, STOCKS, BONDS, Bius AND INFLATioN: 1986 YRARBOOK 16 (1986).
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perceiving the security as debt. High risk in effect transforms a bond into
an equitable instrument. Unfortunately, however, current law ignores these
investor signals by blindly classifying junk bonds as debt, 69 thereby granting
deductions for payments that are essentially shareholder distributions, or
"dividends."
Shareholders inject capital into a corporation and become subject to the
everyday risks of the business, while lenders are "usually unwilling to bear
a substantial risk of corporate failure. '70 The true difference between a
low-risk, low-return (high-grade) bond and a high-risk, high-yield (junk)
bond embraces this same difference between shareholders and lenders be-
cause the degree of investor risk is the key factor separating true debt from
true equity If there is a high degree of risk, "any 'loan' to the corporation
. would necessarily be venture capital in reality, for a business loss by
the corporation would be reflected in an inability to repay the 'loan.'1 71 It
follows from this analysis that when a corporation makes payments on a
junk bond or other high risk instrument, it is making a distribution to an
investor who has supplied venture capital. Unlike repayment on a loan,
such a distribution is not an ordinary cost of doing business. The concept
of income "net of expenses" rejects allowing a deduction for payments that
constitute a return on an investment that was risked upon the success of
the venture. 72 Therefore, so-called "interest payments" on junk bonds are
not business expenses and should not be taxed as such; they are instead
dividend payments that must suffer the burden of double-taxation.
B. Applying Risk Analysis
Lawmakers have certainly been cogmzant of the key role that risk plays
in making the debt-equity distinction. Concerns such as subordination to
other indebtedness, 73 the ratio of debt to equity in the corporation 74 and
other risk factors75 have influenced judicial classification of securities.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 581 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 407 (2d Cir. 1957).
72. Id. ("[T]he Congress decreed different treatment for the loss of funds advanced with
reasonable expectations of repayment than it did for the loss of funds risked upon the
success of a business venture."); see also supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (discussing
the policy reasons supporting the different treatment of debt and equity instruments).
73. I.R.C. § 385(b)(2) (1988). This factor measures nsk because the chance increases that
payment on the subordinated interest in question will be delinquent when other payment
obligations are met first.
74. I.R.C. § 385(b)(3). A lower debt-to-equity ratio means that there is a greater amount
of funds in the business (from the equity capital) to serve as a "cushion" for payment of
fixed obligations, which reduces the likelihood of default on the obligations.
75. Other factors impacting on risk include (1) protection by adequate security, (2) history
of payment of the interest, (3) the use of the advanced funds and (4) the expected source of
the principal and interest payments. Plumb, supra note 3, at 503-35.
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Moreover, a 1985 House of Representatives proposal in this area focused
exclusively on risk factors.76 Even so, as demonstrated earlier, current law
is unmanageable 77 and theoretically unsound.78
The reason that the current law is inappropriate, and the reason that
those who have attempted a risk-analysis solution have eventually given up,
is because of the difficulties of applying it to the securities currently in the
marketplace. Two commentators recently have considered this task, only to
conclude that all securities are risky to a certain degree, making it impossible
to draw an objective line between "risky" and "not risky." 79 However,
although securities lie on a risk continuum, it does not follow that they
cannot be separated in a principled manner.8 0 Rather, through the use of
financial theory, risk can be quantified by examimng the variability of the
return of a security over time.8 The higher the variability, the more the
return on a security fluctuates over time.12 The more a security fluctuates,
the greater the uncertainty, or risk, associated with that security. Investors
in such a security vfil demand a higher rate of return (e.g., a higher interest
rate paid on their bond) as compensation for taking on a greater amount
of uncertainty in their investment. 3 This explains the difference in the
returns demanded on equity securities, such as common stock, and the
returns demanded on debt securities like igh-grade corporate bonds. Equity
has a higher variance than debt,8 so investors demand a greater rate of
return for equity than they do for debt. Variability provides us with
quantifiable distinctions between debt and equity
76. H.R. 2476, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 CONG. Rc. H3180 (daily ed. May 14, 1985).
This bill was a proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 279 dealing exclusively with acquisitions. The
four factors involved were (I) subordination, (2) bond rating, (3) yield to maturity and (4)
capitalization.
77. See supra notes 41-63 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
79. Boyles, The Philosophy Underlying Section 385 Regulations: A Critical Evaluation, 17
TUrsA L.J. 672, 677 (1982) (risk analysis "is virtually impossible to apply in a logical sense
because any investment involves some risk of loss"); Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the
Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. Cm. L. Ray 118, 122 (1985) ("the
difference between the creditor and shareholder is one of degree only").
80. See Boyles, supra note 79, at 678 (admitting that "[i]t is possible to argue that the
difference between a shareholder and a creditor lies in the nature and degree of risk
assumed").
81. R. BRAmLEY & S. MYEns, supra note 4, at 129 (variance measures are natural indices
of nsk).
82. Such "fluctuations of return" are normally reflected in the market price of the security.
For example, if Security A is valued at $100 in year 1, $200 in year 2, $20 in year 3 and $100
in year 4, its variability is greater than that of Security B, which was worth $100 in year 1,
$105 in year 2, $95 in year 3 and $100 in year 4. For a discussion of how these prices are
determined, see R. BREaLEv & S. MYaas, supra note 4, at 47-49.
83. R. BEAa.L-Y & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 127-30.
84. R. BitA yL-Y & S. Myzits, supra note 4, at 131.
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The behavior of a security in the marketplace will indicate whether it
should be classified as debt or equity Those securities with a low variability 5
meet current policy definitions of debt. Since the law's goal is to tax as
debt those funds advanced with the expectation of repayment regardless of
the success of the business, the value of securities classified as debt must
not fluctuate directly with the success of the business. Debt's variability will
be lower because its value, instead of moving up and down with the daily
hazards of business operations, will generally fluctuate only with changes
in the general level of interest rates.8 6 On the other hand, securities with a
high variability fit current policy definitions of equity Equity holders are
the adventurers in the corporate business, and the value of their investment
will fluctuate daily according to perils of the economy which threaten the
success of the venture.17
C. Quantifying the Difference Between Debt and Equity
Given the relationship between the variability of a security and its
riskiness, the remaining task is to determine the rates of return that
correspond to debt variability, and the rates that correspond to equity
variability. In other words, the key to making the debt-equity distinction
is to identify the point at which investors begin demanding an
increased rate of return due to equity-like variability, that is, the equity
premium. To do this, variability must be quantified and empirically
measured. This requires a brief statement of the underlying financial
theory involved. The system-wide risk that concerns diversified investors
is "market risk.'"'8 The sensitivity of an instrument's return to movements
in the market is called its beta.89 The beta measures the amount that
investors expect the price of their investment to change for each one-
percent change in the market. 90 The capital asset pricing model goes on
to explain that in a competitive market, the expected risk premium 9l varies
85. "Low" here should be taken as a level associated with traditional debt instruments,
as opposed to the higher levels associated with traditional equity instruments, which will be
termed as having a "igh" variability.
86. To see why bond values change when the level of interest rates change, see R. BREAL.Y
& S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 47-49.
87 In this way, investors (assurmng a diversified portfolio) are being compensated for
"market nsk," which is the predomnant source of uncertainty/vanability for equity holders.
R. BaRALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 132-33.
88. See supra note 87
89. R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 134.
90. R. BREaiEY & S. MYEas, supra note 4, at 134.
91. The risk premium here means the difference between the investment's expected return
and the nsk-free rate (e.g., the rate on short-term Treasury bills). This relates to the "equity
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in direct proportion to the beta. 92 In simpler terms, the return on an
investment depends on its variability-the higher the beta, the higher the
return. The beta can thus be used to measure risk.
The question remains as to where to draw the line between debt-like betas
and equity-like betas.9 3 The variability of long-term Treasury bonds and the
variability of common stocks can be used as definitive benchmarks of debt
and equity behavior, respectively. By comparing the behavior of these
instruments with that of junk bonds, it becomes evident that junk bonds
are equity, clearly separate from high-grade corporate bonds, which imitate
Treasury bond behavior. High-grade bonds respond primarily to interest
rates, as one would expect of traditional debt securities.Y In contrast, "l]ike
common stocks, junk bond values move up and down with the value of
the issuing firm's assets." 95 "Interest rates are a secondary factor" with
junk bonds,9 the value of which corresponds largely to movements in stock
prices and the performance of the economy 9
This dichotomy has been empirically proven. A recent study suggests that
a one-percent change in general interest rate levels had an impact on high-
grade bond prices almost fifteen times that of the impact on low-grade
bond prices.9 s More importantly, this study revealed that the beta for low-
grade bonds was .43, while high-grade bonds had a beta of only .22. 9 The
market risk for low-grade bonds was approximately twice that of their high-
grade counterparts. Furthermore, that high-grade bonds had a beta of .22
shows that their sensitivity to the market is almost identical to the market
premium'' in that the "equity premium" is that portion of the total risk premium which
investors demand for holding equity.
92. R. BRmALEY & S. Myras, supra note 4, at 137-39 (discussing the capital asset pncing
model and the relationship between nsk and return). The formula expressing this concept is
"expected return = r. + ft (r, - r)," where P is beta, r. is the market risk premium and r.
is the risk-free rate. Id. at 138; ef. id. at 163-64 (discussing the arbitrage pricing theory, which
assumes that each instrument's return depends on various independent factors, and concludes
that an instrument's risk premium will depend on (1) the risk premium associated with each
factor, and (2) the instrument's sensitivity to each factor).
93. Although, as shown infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text, the securities examined
in this Note separated themselves neatly into distinct groups, facilitating the identification of
definite beta values which correspond to equity-risks and definite beta values which correspond
to debt-risks.
94. See R. BREA EY & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 47-49.
95. Perry & Taggart, supra note 37, at 40.
96. B. Cornell & K. Green, The Investment Performance of Low-Grade Bond Funds 8
(Oct. 4, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
97. Id., Sharpe & Cooper, Risk-Return Classes of New York Stock Exchange Common
Stocks: 1931-1967, Fin. ANiiLYsTs J., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 46 (showing that portfolios composed
of securities in lower risk-return classes tend to move less with market swings).
98. B. Cornell & K. Green, supra note 96, at 9, 15.
99. B. Cornell & K. Green, supra note 96, at 15. The data for these figures was gathered
for the period 1'960-88. The beta was estimated by regressing the bond returns on the return
on the Standard & Poor's 500 (i.e., the Standard & Poor's 500 stocks were used to represent
the movement of the economy, and this movement was compared to the fluctuations of bond
returns).
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sensitivity of long-term Treasury bonds (beta of .20), while the beta for
low-grade bonds is nowhere near the other two.10
These results hardly present the risk-continuum problem pondered ear-
lier.101 To the contrary, the results show that there is a distinct difference
between the behavior of high-grade and low-grade bonds. High-grade bonds
are debt. Like long-term Treasury bonds, their value fluctuates with interest
rates and is relatively insensitive to general economic conditions. 10 2
Conversely, low-grade bonds are equity. Their value is relatively insensitive
to interest rate changes but experiences equity-like fluctuations. The bright
line that is drawn between debt and equity here can also be quantitatively
measured through securities' returns. Empirical results confirm that investors
demand a risk premium in compensation for the higher beta. 03 The return
demanded for the low-grade bonds averaged three percent above the one-
month Treasury bill return'04 (the "federal rate"). 0 5 This three percent
measures the premium over the (risk-free) federal rate that investors demand
for holding securities that behave like equity Securities that return less than
the federal rate plus three percent should be granted a full deduction for
federal income tax purposes. But once investors demand a return equal to
the federal rate plus three percent, they are receiving an equity premium
(in exchange for venture capital) and no deduction should be allowed.' °
D Option Pricing Theory
Financial theory is helpful in analyzing and understanding why junk
bonds are more like equity than debt. When someone invests in a junk
bond, she is in essence lending her money to the corporation (the borrower).
This can also be viewed in terms of option pricing. Whenever a firm
100. B. Cornell & K. Green, supra note 96, at 15.
101. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
103. B. Cornell & K. Green, supra note 96, at 6; see also supra notes 89-92 and accompanying
text (predicting this result).
104. The yearly return for low-grade bonds was 8.04%, while the return for one-month
Treasury bills was 6.12%. However, the reported return for the low-grade bonds was net of
management and adrmimstrative costs of approximately 1% per year. Thus, the risk premium
demanded by investors is equal to 2.92% (8.04% minus 5.12%), which represents the margin
by which the gross return on the low-grade fund exceeded the short-term Treasury bill rate.
B. Cornell & K. Green, supra note 96, at 5, 15.
105. The one-month Treasury bill rate will be used and referred to as the federal rate
because this rate can represent an economic index of the general level of interest rates.
106. This Note's proposal using the federal rate plus three percent can be compared to
other proposals. The American Law Institute proposed to limit all interest deductions to the
federal long-term rate plus two percent. A.L.I., supra note 12, at 86. No reasons were given
for selecting the two percent figure. Similarly, it is unknown how Rep. Pickle of Texas decided
on a limit of 135% of the federal long-term rate in H.R. 2476, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 131
CONG. REc. H3180 (dally ed. May 14, 1985).
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borrows, it creates for itself an option because the firm is not irrevocably
compelled to repay that debt. Instead, the firm has the option of defaulting
on the debt and surrendering its assets to the debt-holder. Thus, the junk
bond holder effectively acquires the company (really just her share of it)
when she lends the money, and the company retains the option to buy the
company back by paying off the debt.ic 7 When deciding whether to exercise
its option, the crucial determination for the borrower is whether the assets
of the firm are worth more than the value of the debt.'08 If, when the
option expires (when the debt becomes due), the value of the firm's stock
is worth less than the amount of the debt, the firm can refuse to exercise
its option, leaving to the lenders the stock ownership. 1' 9
This analysis shows how any lender could be viewed as a potential owner
of the business. However, the possibility that a junk bond holder will end
up owning the assets of the firm is much greater than with high-grade
bonds. This is because for a firm making its option payments on junk
bonds the price of exercising its optionas extremely high (i.e., the firm has
higher interest expense). Therefore, the chance that a stock's value will be
below the exercise price is much greater than with a security demanding
much lower option (interest) payments. Compounding this probability is the
drop in asset value effected each time a huge cash outlay is required to pay
interest on the junk bonds. In such cases it might be suspected that any
junk bond holder effectively owns a share of the corporation." 0
In this way financial theory itself supports the empirical difference found
in high-grade and low-grade bond values,"' and helps explain why junk
bond values coincide with stock price fluctuations." 2 By combining the
empirical data with this financial theory it can be concluded that when a
bond is returning less than three percent over the federal rate, there is a
great enough probability of the firm exercising its option to pay off its
debts that the option payments made can be considered deductible payments
to a creditor. But when a bond is returning greater than three percent over
the federal rate, there is a sufficient likelihood that the lender will retain
ownership of the firm's assets so that the payments to such lenders are akin
to a non-deductible distribution to investors with an equity interest.
107. R. BaxALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 471-78. When the company decides to honor
its debt obligations, it is "exercising its option." The exercise price is the amount that the
borrower must pay the debt-holder in order to satisfy the payment or payments due.
108. The borrower in essence makes this determination every time it makes interest payments
(e.g., by making the first interest payment, the firm exercises its option to advance to the
second interest payment, and so on until it makes its final interest payment, which gives it
the option of paying off the pnncipal, thereby exercising its final option and acquiring the
firm's assets). R. BREA.EY & S. MYERs, supra note 4, at 565.
109. R. BRE.ALEY & S. MYnRs, supra note 4, at 481.
110. R. BEALE.sY & S. MYas, supra note 4, at 482.
111. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
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V. APPLICATION OF THE THREE-PERCENT TEST
The solution proposed above was developed through risk analysis and
was verified empincally using junk bond data. In addition to junk bonds,
the solution can apply to any security issued by a corporation. Questions
may arise as to (1) how to apply this "federal rate plus three percent" test
to complex instruments that can be broken down, and (2) varying the three-
percent rate for different issuers. The remainder of this Note deals with
these practical difficulties.
A. Bifurcation
A collateral issue that always arises when formulating a solution to the
debt-equity problem concerns whether a security should be bifurcated.
Bifurcation entails taxing a single security partly as debt and partly as
equity 1a The alternative approach to bifurcation is the "all-or-nothing"
method. This method identifies a security as either debt or equity, and then
either allows or disallows any deduction." 4
Clearly, the all-or-nothing approach has commanded the support of judges
and lawmakers. Most courts have refused to fragment instruments into part
equity and part debt," 5 and the Treasury has not incorporated bifurcation
'into its regulations although Congress authorized it to do so in 1989.1 6 But
the all-or-nothing approach is not without its critics. One criticism is that
the approach leads to tax inequities because a corporation that issues a
combination of straight debt and straight equity will only be granted a
deduction for the debt portion of the securities it issues, while a corporation
that issues the economic equivalent of such a combination in one security
(i.e., a "hybrid") may get a deduction for all payments on all of its
securities." 7 A second criticism relates to the incentive created by the inequity
113. For example, a hybrid security which pays 10% could be bifurcated by ailowing an
interest deduction for payments on the security of up to 4% (if the security is determined to
be 40% debt and 60% equity).
114. Using the same example, the corporation would either be able to deduct. the entire
10%, or else it would have to pay the entire 10% out of after-tax dollars.
115. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS, 4.2, at 4-7 (4th ed. 1979).
116. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385 (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.385 (1982), withdrawn, T.D. 7920,
1983-2 C.B. 69 (effective Aug. 5, 1983). However, a 1989 amendment to § 385 added "(or as
in part stock and in part indebtedness)" before the period at the end of subsection (a). Budget
Recordation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7208(a)(1), 103 Stat. 2106, 2337 (1989). In the
future, courts might interpret this amendment as implicit authorization to treat a single
instrument as part stock and part indebtedness, but this kind of bifurcation has not yet
occurred.
117 Madison, supra note 4, at 495-500. This same argument can also be seen in criticisms
of proposed I.R.C. § 386, H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., ist Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H5812 (daily
ed. Sept. 20, 1989), which applies to original issue discount and payment in kind debentures.
See, e.g., Levin & Gallagher, Proposed Code Section 386 Treating OlD and PIK Debentures
as Preferred Stock, 45 TAX NOTES 87 (1989).
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just described. The opportunity to gain deductibility while issuing a security
with equity features is viewed as an unjustified tax expenditure that subsi-
dizes complex financial instruments and distorts economic incentives."'
When the security in question is economically equivalent to a combination
of a debt security and an equity security, these criticisms are valid and the
case for bifurcation prevails. Adhering to the analysis outlined earlier,
disallowing an interest deduction for a clearly defined equity portion of an
otherwise debt-like instrument yields the correct measurement of income for
the instrument as a whole. Therefore, where it is clear that the market is
identifying the debt features of a bond and valuing them separately, bifur-
cation is appropriate.11 9
Bifurcation is not appropriate when classifying junk bonds. The empirical
behavior of bond values'2 reveals the problem with proposals that advocate
bifurcating junk bonds. 21 A straight interest-bearing bond will behave, as
a whole, as either debt or equity. The return on a straight interest-bearing
bond is a function of its risk, and not a function of debt and equity
components which can be broken down and given separate tax treatment.
Thus, no such bond should ever be bifurcated. Since junk bonds are
essentially equity, bifurcating these bonds by granting a flat-rate deduction
for some portion of interest paid on them would be analytically identical
to giving a deduction for portions of dividend payments on common stock,
on the basis that the shares contain some separate, less-risky, debt-like
component. With respect to an instrument that returns in excess of the
federal rate plus three percent, the full amount of the payment to investors
is compensation for an equity risk assumed. There is no reason to bifurcate
and allow a deduction for a part of the payment.
B. Whether to Vary the Three-Percent Rate
One criticism to the risk analysis solution proposed in this Note is that
it is not fair to apply the same rate across the board. It is argued that since
a blue-chip share of stock may bear less risk than a loan for a start-up
venture, legitimate debt of some firms will be riskier than equity of other
118. Madison, supra note 4, at 500; see also supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
119. For example, this situation would be most obvious where a corporation has two types
of bonds outstanding, both paying a fixed rate of interest, but with the second one paying an
additional amount equal to the dividends paid on the corporation's common stock. The
valuation of the second type of bond can be readily broken down into a value for the fixed
payments (which will be equal to the value of the first type of bond) and the value of the
equity features (the additional amount which an investor would pay for the second type of
bond).
120. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
121. A proposal for a flat rate disallowance on deductible interest payments made on bonds
would effectively bifurcate instruments such as junk bonds. For an example of such a proposal,
see JoiNr Comm. ON TAx'N, supra note 30, at 104-05.
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firms, rendering risk analysis impractical. 12 The key to overcoming, this
criticism is to focus on what is reflected in the rate of return that a firm
must pay in order to raise funds. When this rate reflects risk, all of the
income measurement policies are implicated' 3 and so there is no inequity
in treating risky firms differently than non-risky firms. Only when the rate
of return on an instrument reflects factors other than risk may it be necessary
to raise this "federal rate plus three percent" so that payments on securities
of which the return equals or exceeds that amount may be deductible."2-
For example, one risk factor that will affect the return a firm must offer
to raise funds is the debt-to-equity ratio of the firm. 125 Another factor is
simply the inherent risk of the firm's business operations. 26 When firms
differ in these respects, taxing them differently not only is consistent with
economic income measurement policies, but such a result also is entirely
necessary in order to enforce those policies. A risky venture offers investors
a chance for huge returns in exchange for a supply of funds, because of
the feast or famine nature of its operations. Investors who supply such
funds realize the nature of this arrangement and are voluntarily adventuring
in the entrepreneurial risks, whether their funds are supplied in return for
a note or a stock certificate. Just because a particular firm is presently
unable to issue certain securities with a risk low enough to meet the definition
of equity presented in this Note does not mean the definition should change.
If one did adjust the definition for certain of these firms, one would be
abandoning the distinction that section 385 27 mandates. There is no injustice
in letting "debt-labeled" securities issued by a risky venture compete with
the "equity-labeled" securities of a stable firm when both are offering an
equity premium in return for funds. Indeed, allowing a deduction for a
risky venture's debt securities when they offer an equity premium would
122. See, e.g., Boyles, supra note 79, at 677 n.62.
123. Higher interest rates signal venture capital which does not warrant an interest deduction.
See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
124. A discussion of possible factors other than risk factors that could affect the rate of
return on a security is beyond the scope of this Note. One area of concern, though, could be
the economic power of the issuer. A large blue-chip firm will have easier access to financial
markets and more marketable securities than would a firm with less economic power, even
though the actual risk of the issued securities may be no different. It is suggested that
adjustments to the "federal rate plus three percent" standard could be made for such situations.
125. R. Kopcke & E. Rosengren, Regulation of Debt and Equity 21 (Sept. 1989) (Prepared
for the October 1989 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's conference Are the Distinctions
Between Equity and Debt Disappearing?) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana
Law Journal) ("As leverage increases, so does the probability of default and the interest
rate."). For an explanation of the debt-to-equity ratio as it relates to risk, see supra note 74
and accompanying text.
126. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 30, at 105; see also P Kuipec, Microfoundations
of Systematic Risk (1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal)
(Systematic risk depends on the firm's production technology, scale of operations, its output
and input prices and other risk characteristics.).
127 I.R.C. § 385.
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operate as an injustice to the stable firm issuing the same premium but
being double-taxed on its distributions.
CONCLUSION
Even some investment bankers will admit that junk debt is really disguised
equity.'2 This Note shows that junk bonds are analytically equivalent to
equity securities for federal income tax purposes. In essence it has provided
a principled basis for a notion that many financial experts have long
suspected to be true. The behavior of financiers, investors and the market
itself lends implicit support to the theory that junk bonds are econonucally
equivalent to equity. In the area of marketing junk bonds to investors, such
support has recently become apparent. With investors becoming aware of
the attendant risks, sweeteners like equity-kickers are increasingly reqmred
to sell junk bond deals. 129
This trend seriously undermines the arguments of those who contend that
junk bonds cannot be equity because their holders do not share the same
rights and privileges as equity holders. Further acknowledgement that junk
bonds cross over the debt-equity threshold is found in the area of bankruptcy
law. There, equity has long been considered a cushion to protect creditors
from the risk of insolvency 130 Junk bonds are now, like equity, becoming
part of that cushion, as courts are classifying debt issued in leveraged
buyouts as capital contributions.' In some instances the interests of junk
bond holders are being further subordinated, even to the interests of
common stock holders. 32 In denying junk bond holders traditional creditor
rights, society is recognizing that junk bond holders should be grouped with
the other "adventurers in the corporate enterpnse"-the equity holders.
Tax regulation must make this same adjustment and begin to tax junk
bonds as equity.
Furthermore, the data and conclusions herein have provided a necessary
tool for constructing a partially integrated corporate tax system. Presently,
integration proposals are shooting at a moving (and sometimes invisible)
target because it is unclear which corporate payments (debt payments or
equity payments, or both) will be subject to relief. This Note's conclusion
128. Sheppard, supra note 13, at 1143.
129. Wall St. J.,. Oct. 20, 1989, at CI, col. 3.
130. C. Normandin, The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity: A Legal Perspective 2
(prepared for the October 1989 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston's conference Are the Distinc-
tions Between Equity and Debt Disappearing?) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Indiana Law Journal).
131. Id. at 25-26.
132. Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1989, at Cl, col. 6. The possibility that Revco shareholders
nught get control of the bankrupt company in front of junk bond holders means that
"junkholders might lose out to equity holders in other bankruptcy cases." Id. at C2, col. 3.
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that payments in excess of the federal rate plus three percent represent an
equity premium provides the boundaries of deductibility for an integration
proposal.
Bonds that offer a return greater than three percent above the federal
rate are compensating investors for an equity risk. Other types of instruments
with the same characteristics will behave in the same way and should also
be taxed as equity The principles of this Note can be further extended to
other areas of the law For example, in order to circumscribe regulations
that restrict financial intermediaries from holding equity securities, such
intermediaries will often hold risky debt in order to earn a'competitive rate
of return. 33 This practice should be disallowed, as it has been established
that the risks of junk bonds and the risks of equity securities will pose
similar threats to the stability of the intermediary No matter what the area
of regulation, risk analysis provides sound support that high-risk instruments
are in essence equity, and they should be treated as such.
133. R. Kopcke & E. Rosengren, supra note 125, at 26.
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